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The Federal Rules from the
Standpoint of the '
Colorado Code
By PHILIP S. VAN CISE*
This is one of the addresses which were delivered at the Judicial Conference of the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The address of President Robert L. Stearns hag been
previously published in the Rocky Mountain Law Review. Other lectures will be printed
in subsequent issues. Judge Alfred Murrah's address appears in the July issue of the
American Bar Association Journal.

The Federal Rules are the vintage of 1938, the Colorado Code that
of 1887. The latter was patterned largely on the Field Code of New
York, which had been hastily drafted and rushed through the New York
legislature to take advantage of a waning reform movement. The Rules
are the result of three years study by a very eminent advisory committee
selected by the Supreme Court of the United States, which was adequately financed in its research.
The Rules were adopted as a unit. So was the Code, but many
amendments have been engrafted upon it by subsequent legislatures, as
well as by the Supreme Court.
In 1938 the Colorado Bar Association voted to merge the Colorado
Code, as far as practicable, with the Federal Rules. Since then a committee of the Colorado bar, with no funds except for printing and postage,
has been wrestling with the problem. Its first draft has been completed,
and early in July the second draft should be mailed to every member of
the Colorado bar.
The Federal Rules are a combination of the old federal equity rules
and statutes, the present English system and the state codes. The Colorado Code was a revolt against common law pleading. Yet despite
statements therein that it was to be liberally construed, the influence of
common law decisions was long evident in the construction of its provisions. That same tendency has been reflected in a few of the federal decisions on the Rules.
In considering the Federal Rules in relation to the Code, we must
ascertain, first, whether or not the Federal Rules are all-inclusive; second,
whether they themselves incorporate the state practice to any extent; and,
third, whether certain state statutes or decisions not mentioned in the
Rules are controlling irrespective of the Rules. Then we will consider
the Rules and the state practice.
*Chairman Colorado Bar Association Committee on Merging the Code with the
Federal Rules.
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Rule 1 would seem to answer all three of these questions.
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It states:

"these rules govern the procedure * * * in all suits of a civil nature *
* *

with the exceptions stated in Rule 81." Rule 81 then specifically itemizes the excluded exceptions. So now we might state: "Here in these
86 Rules we have all the procedure."
However, we soon find that this is optimistic, because Rule 64 says,
"all remedies providing for seizure of person or property * * * are available under the circumstances and in the manner provided by law of the
state in which the district court is held." Therefore, in arrest, attachment, garmishment, replevin and similar remedies resort must be had to
the state code of civil procedure. But this is not all. The state law also
controls, by Rule 4, constructive service of process; by Rule 17 (b),
capacity to sue or be sued; and by Rule 69 (a), execution and supplementary proceedings. Hence the Rules do refer to state provisions and
require us constantly to refer to the Code in matters so identified.
We now come to our third question-are there any state statutes or
decisions which are not mentioned in the Rules which control procedure?
The answer is yes, there are many such, and each district will face its
own set, which may be entirely different from those in any other district.
This occurs when these statutes and decisions affect substantive law, and
they control, even if in direct contradiction of the Rules. This is because
the much discussed opinion in Erie Railroad vs. Tompkins, 304 U. S.
64, 82 L. Ed. 1188, was decided after the advisory committee had made
its report, and in no way could this decision have been contemplated by
it. This case holds that in matters of substantive law where the claim
arises under the state law, not only are the federal courts bound by the
interpretation placed by the state courts upon the statutes of the state,
but are also bound by the state construction of the common and nonstatutory law of the state.
Therefore, in drafting a complaint or answer based upon state
statutes or practice, whether statutory or common law, the practitioner
must first examine the decisions of the state to ascertain the substantive
law, and then he should see that his complaint or answer sets forth the
requirements thereof.
So far we have found only two places in Colorado where these
matters of substantive law might apply to pleading. The first is the
Colorado statute on libel and slander, Section 75 of the Code. It provides that the defendant in his answer may allege any mitigating circumstances to reduce the amount of the damages. This we believe to be substantive law, so we amended Rule 8 (c) on affirmative defenses,. and
added a sentence, "Any mitigating circumstances to reduce the amount
of damage shall be affirmatively pleaded."
The second instance is the difference between the statutes of limita-
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tions on causes of action arising in- Colorado and those arising in a f oreign state. Rule 2 says that a civil action is commenced by filing a complaint, and the Colorado statutes on limitations in all causes of action
arising in Colorado have something to the effect that the action is barred
unless commenced in a certain number of years. Hence, filing a complaint would toll the statute, under either Rule or Code. But Section
17, Chapter 102, Volume 3, C. S. A., states, "when a cause * * * arises
in another state or territory or in a foreign country, and by the laws
thereof an action cannot be maintained against a person by reason of the
lapse of time, an action thereon shall not be maintained against him in
this state." If in that foreign state the law requires a summons to be
served to bar the statute, the fact that it was not served must be pleaded,
and then Rule 2 would not apply.
To the same effect we find the federal decisions holding that if any
of the various affirmative defenses in Rule 8 (c) must, under state law,
be negatived in the complaint, the state rule must prevail.
In Illinois and New York the statutes require the plaintiff in a
damage suit to plead and prove his freedom from contributory negligence. This was held substantive law, which must be followed: Francis
vs. Humphrey (D. C. Ill.), 1939, 25 Fed. Supp. 1; Schoff us. Muller
Dairies (D. C. N. Y.), 1938, 25 Fed. Supp. 20.
In matters of evidence and procedure therein, we likewise find that
where substantive law enters in, the state decisions control. One Colorado rule comes to mind.
In an unbroken line of decisions, from Knox vs. McFarren, 4 Colo.
586, to Fleming vs. McFerson, 94 Colo. 1, the Colorado Supreme Court
has held that a party has the right to rely upon a recorded deed, and that
the burden of showing that he is not a bona fide purchaser for value is
upon the one so asserting. This is the same as the Texas rule. And the
Supreme Court of the United States, in Cities Service Oil Co. vs. Dunlap
(1939), 84 L. Ed. 185, held in an action to quiet title by the holder of
the recorded deed that the burden of proving those facts was on the
respondent.
So much for the incompleteness of the Rules, and the necessity for
outside study in certain cases.
Now let us look at the problem; can the Rules be merged with the
Code under our state practice and customs so as to form one instrument?
We attempted to answer this question by using the Rules as far as possible, but retained the Colorado provisions where we believed that the
lawyers overwhelmingly prefer them to the Rules, or where the Constitution of Colorado so requires. Then we added the Code provisions
omitted from the Rules and thus combined and merged the Rules and the
Code into a complete plan for civil procedure. But this only applied to
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civil actions. Special proceedings, in the main, are still left in a class by
themselves, as at present under both Rules and Code.
Some of our problems, and objections to a complete merger, will
readily become apparent upon an examination of the two procedures.
Rule 3 provides that the complaint shall be filed and thereafter,
under Rule 4,the clerk issues the summons. But the lawyers of Colorado have always been empowered by statute to issue the summons themselves. About 1912 the Supreme Court made a rule limiting the issuance of summons to the clerk, and such a protest arose from the bar that
it was quickly repealed. The advantage of the practice is that in case of
an emergency a lawyer can forthwith get out a summons and serve the
defendant, and this is of particular value in a large city or when the lawyer does not live in the county seat. Hence the Colorado practice was
retained and the lawyer can issue the summons. However, despite the
Code, many lawyers wonder about the constitutional right of a lawyer
to issue a summons, which is a court process in the name of "The People
of the State of Colorado."
. Now for constructive service of process and those matters mentioned
in Rules 17, 64 and 69, where the Rules follow the state practice. That
was rather an easy job. All we did was to take these portions of the
Code, attempt to harmonize their provisions with the other language of
the Rules, and insert them in their respective places. Yet to our amazement no other state has handled this situation in this manner. Arizona,
which has adopted the Federal Rules almost in toto, in its Rule 64 uses
almost the exact federal words: "all remedies providing for seizure of
person or property * * * are available under the circumstances and in the
manner provided by the law of the state." In their drafts Oregon says
that these remedies are available as "now provided by law," and Rhode
Island makes things easy with the expression "by the law of this state."
Those three states, therefore, require the use of another volume to ascertain just what is the remedy, and thus their new Rules do not make a
complete Code.
Rule 5 (b), on how service is made, leaves too much room for
argument when it states that the paper may be left with "some person of
A fifteen-year-old boy might possess age
suitable age and discretion."
but not discretion. The Colorado Code fixed fifteen years, but the committee changed it to eighteen years, hoping that both age and discretion
would thereby be secured, but in any event stopping a possible dispute as
to construction.
Now we come to a provision which has given us more trouble than
any other, and that is Rule 5 (d), on filing and serving, and Rule 12 (a),
(e) and (f), on defenses. The Rules fix most dates from the time of
service. But this opens the door to disputes as to when service was
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actually made. Hence the committee decided that time should be fixed
by the date of filing, about which there could be no argument. This
resulted in many amendments which in several instances took a lot of
time to study and correlate.
Rule 8, "General Rules of Pleading," has been very much construed by the federal courts. Its subdivision (e) (1) has resulted in
considerable conflict of decision and doubt as to whether the Rules permit
pleading on information and belief and whether ultimate facts or conclusions of law can be set up either in the complaint or in the answer.
This subdivision now reads:
"Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise and
direct. No technical forms of pleading or motions are required."
To get away from the present uncertainty of decision, we have changed
it to read:
"Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise and
direct. When a pleader is without direct knowledge allegations
may be made upon information and belief. No technical forms of
pleading or motions are required. Pleadingsotherwise meeting the
requirements of these rules shall not be considered objectionable for
failure to state ultimate facts, as distinguished from conclusions of
law." (The italics are the additions.)
Rule 10 (a) states how parties shall be named, but makes no provisions for parties whose names are unknown or for unknown parties.
We therefore added these sentences:
"A party whose name is not known shall be designated by any
name and the words 'whose true name is unknown'. In an action
in rem unknown parties shall be designated as 'all unknown persons
who claim any interest in the subject matter of this action.' "
Except possibly by inference, the rules make no provision for attacking an answer for insufficiency in law (our old demurrer practice).
Hence we added to Rule 12 (f), which is captioned "Motion to Strike,"
these words:
"The objection that an answer or separate defense therein fails to
state a legal defense may be raised by motion filed under this subdivision."
Let us now take up the deposition and discovery provisions in
Chapter V of the Rules. As far as we are advised, these are by far the
most advanced steps taken to date in any jurisdiction. Yet we think
they still have two very serious defects, as well as one which is too
expensive for the average litigant.
Rule 26 allows unlimited right to take a deposition after answer,
but only by leave of court before that time. Our committee believes that
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this is an unnecessary and expensive practice. In Colorado if an attorney
lives outside of Denver he would have the extra expense of a trip to the
city to get this order. If the judge is absent, nothing can be done until
his return, unless we bother one of the judges of the Circuit Court of
Appeals. And in states where none of them is in residence that relief is
not available. The speaker has known too many cases where service of
a summons, accompanied by a notice to take deposition, has brought
many a crooked defendant to time right now, where delay would have
been fatal. That absolute right to take depositions at any time after the
service of the summons is now in our Code and we have preserved it.
The second defect in Rule 26 is that we believe that it is applicable
to "actions" alone, and not to "special proceedings." Our Code limits
depositions in special proceedings so that they can only be taken after an
issue of fact has been raised. But this is very unjust. The federal district courts do not have probate proceedings, but the state courts do.
Under Colorado practice a will contest arises from a caveat to the petition to probate the will and the answer thereto. The issue of fact is only
between the caveat and the answer. Suppose an important witness is at
the point of death. No legal deposition can be taken until that answer
is filed, and if the proponent of the will can successfully stall for time
he wins his case by the death of the witness. Many other instances could
be cited to show just as great a necessity for the immediate taking of a
deposition in a special proceeding as in an action. Hence we have provided in Rule 81 that Rules 26 to 37 shall apply to all special proceedings
so that the benefit of discovery is available to all litigants.
This, of course, raises the entire question of how special proceedings
should be handled. We believe that so far as practicable they should be
covered by the Rules. We have not yet been able to decide on the language to show when they are covered and when they are not. We
expect to settle that matter at our three-day committee institute next
week.
Now for an expensive section of the Rules. In small towns good
stenographers are scarce, and hiring an outside stenographer at folio rates
is always costly. Hence we felt that Rule 28 (c) prohibiting the taking
of depositions by an employee of an, attorney was an unnecessary hardship to litigants, and that portion of the subdivision was stricken by us.
Under Rule 30 (b) parties have plenty of protection and can secure an
order for another stenographer if they believe the one designated will be
incompetent or unfair.
It is always much easier to criticize than to construct. And so while
drafting a Rule is a-very difficult job, finding flaws in it later, when a
lawyer is called upon to determine the meaning of a Rule, is comparatively simple. The last word "therein" in the first sentence of Rule
36 (a) is an illustration of this.

176

DICTA
"At any time after the pleadings are closed, a party may serve
upon any other party a written request for the admission by the
latter of the genuineness of any relevant documents described in and
exhibited with the request or of the truth of any relevant matters
of fact set forth therein."

Does this "therein" refer to the facts set forth in the documents or
in the request? We believe it means the latter, so we have changed
"therein" to "in the request."
Rule 43 (b) provides that the "managing agent" of a party may
be called for cross examination. But that phase is not defined and hence
is uncertain. Under London Guarantee & Accident Co. vs. Officer, 78
Colo. 441, 444, it was held that the term "managing agent" meant just
one party, which is too narrow a construction. Hence, we defined the
term in our Rule 110 by stating "a superintendent, overseer, foreman,
sales director, or person occupying a similar position, may be considered
a managing agent for the purposes of these rules." In Rule 43 (b) we
also added to the list of employers whose employees could be cross examined the words "body politic," so that if a suit was by or against any
municipality, county or state agency, cross examination of its officers or
agents would be proper.
We very much preferred the appellate procedure of the Rules to the
writ of error practice of the Code. But the Colorado Constitution provides for writ of error from the County Court to the Supreme Court,
and for that reason in Colorado in 1912 writ of error practice was substituted for appeals. Hence we adhered to that practice rather than the
federal procedure.
However, in Rule 75 the federal requirement in subdivision (b)
for filing two copies of the stenographer's transcript needlessly enriches
the court reporter, while the preparation of the record by the clerk under
subdivision (g) is far more expensive than the state practice.
When we got through with the Rules we had to add the Code
sections which were not covered. And now, except for the excluded
special proceedings, which we will enumerate in Rule 81, our proposed
Rules are a completed merger of the Rules and the Code. In the main
we have made one system of practice for both courts, in the main both
federal and Colorado decisions will be applicable to the subdivisions of
the Rules because we have followed the same structural system, and in
the main we believe that our proposed Rules will be a great advance on
the present Code.
In any event, if adopted, the proposed Colorado procedure will be
enacted, as were the federal measures, by rule of court, instead of by act
of the legislature. If they work well, they will be retained; if they are
faulty, they can easily be amended. And that step, the governing of
procedure by the courts instead of the lawmakers, is the great move forward both in federal and state practice.
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Yet there is one danger signal ahead of both sets of rules. The
Federal Rules now are, and ours, if adopted, will be, based upon power
allegedly conferred by the legislature. Personally, the speaker believes
the court has this power inherently, but has been unwilling to exercise it.
Passing that point, however, future legislation is very apt to be enacted
both by Congress and state assemblies, contradictory of the Rule provisions.
One interesting case in point is the action of Congress in regard to
patent procedure. In 1897 (Title 35, Sec. 69, U. S. C. A.) an act was
passed which provided, among other matters, that
"In any action for infringement the defendant may plead the
general issue, and, having given notice in writing to the plaintiff or
his attorney thirty days before, may prove on trial any one or more
of the following special matters."
(Then follow five paragraphs, including fraud.)
This was still on the statute books when the Rules went into effect
in September, 1938, and was repealed by them.
Yet on August 5, 1939, Congress re-enacted the same statute practically verbatim! We don't know why 'it was re-passed. But we do
know that under that statute you simply deny infringement in your
answer and then give notice, 30 days before trial, of what you are going
to prove. The rules are different. Under 12 (b) you must assert every
defense in the answer, and under 9 (b) fraud must be stated with particularity. We know of no decision on this point, but right now we are
faced with the interpretation of this statute in a patent case in Nebraska.
We hope we are right, as we followed the rule and disregarded the statute, on the theory that Congress, having delegated its power to control
procedure to the Supreme Court, cannot indirectly reassume it.
But the fact that such a statute has been passed, and that many
more will be passed in the future, illustrates the need for vigilance. The
courts now have power, either inherently, as the Colorado Supreme
Court has held in Kohlnman vs. People, 89 Colo. 8, 32, or by the federal
and Colorado statutes specifically conferring it, to control procedure. If
this right rests upon statute alone, the bar must see that that power
remains in the courts, the American bar must check the procedure enactments of Congress, and the state bars the procedure statutes of their
legislatures. We have Rules which are intended to facilitate the rights of
litigants at a minimum of cost. We, the bar, will endeavor to keep our
legislators in line, not to overturn these Rules. And we, the bar, on
behalf of ourselves and our clients, look to you, the judges who construe
the laws, liberally to interpret these Rules so that in fact they will lend
themselves "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action." (Rule 1.)

